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Abstract
It is widely believed that one’s peers influence product adoption behaviors.
This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker
receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold when
the “pattern” by which it receives these signals vary and when peer influence is
directed towards choices which are not optimal. To investigate that, we manipulate
social signal exposure in an online controlled experiment using a game with human
participants. Each participant in the game makes a decision among choices with
differing utilities. We observe the following: (1) even in the presence of monetary
risks and previously acquired knowledge of the choices, decision-makers tend to
deviate from the obvious optimal decision when their peers make similar decision
which we call the influence decision, (2) when the quantity of social signals vary
over time, the forwarding probability of the influence decision and therefore being
responsive to social influence does not necessarily correlate proportionally to the
absolute quantity of signals. To better understand how these rules of peer
influence could be used in modeling applications of real world diffusion and in
networked environments, we use our behavioral findings to simulate spreading
dynamics in real world case studies. We specifically try to see how cumulative
influence plays out in the presence of user uncertainty and measure its outcome on
rumor diffusion, which we model as an example of sub-optimal choice diffusion.
Together, our simulation results indicate that sequential peer effects from the
influence decision overcomes individual uncertainty to guide faster rumor diffusion
over time. However, when the rate of diffusion is slow in the beginning, user
uncertainty can have a substantial role compared to peer influence in deciding the
adoption trajectory of a piece of questionable information.
1 Introduction
The connections and interactions of individuals that comprise social networks are
generally believed to impact decision-making in many domains including product
selection and decision making in uncertain environments [1, 2]. While there is general
theoretical consensus that social influence, the phenomenon by which an individual’s
opinions, behaviors, and decisions are influenced by other people [3], facilitates product
selection, the empirical literature is actually quite torn. According to individual utility
models, people adopt technologies when its benefits exceed its costs [4]. Because
comparing every option can be cognitively costly and time consuming, individuals
May 27, 2020 1/40
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
01
40
9v
3 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 26
 M
ay
 20
20
employ cognitive strategies and shortcuts that reduce the number of alternatives until
one superior option is left [5]. Social signals factor into the strategies because they
provide a cost-efficient means of acquiring information.
Some find that social information predicts selection decisions [6] and others have
reported interactions between a decision-maker’s experience and/or knowledge of the
product and their general susceptibility to social influence [7]. It is critical that research
agendas pursue understanding of these nuances because as technologies become more
sophisticated, widely used, and powerful, so does their potential to be used for harm.
The recent slew of worldwide cyber-attacks is a potent example of how the selection of
cyber-defense venders will affect billions of people [8]; if cyber-defense ‘shoppers’ are
subject to ‘sub-optimal’ social influence, how will their decisions be affected? The
choice to follow the herd may not be the best strategy when the herd chooses ‘wrong’.
Similarly. the widespread rise in misinformation has detrimental impacts in society and
where social influence has known to be adversely impacting the decision making process
leading to undesirable contagion [9, 10]. In both these situations, the choice to follow
the herd may not be the obvious optimal choice and social influence can play a
detrimental role. In this paper, we investigate the role of patterns of influence (PoI) or
the manner in which an individual is repeatedly subject to the same piece of
information over time by being embodied in a connected environment with other
individuals, on behavior diffusion. We extend our recent work on understanding the role
of PoI towards individual decision making using a controlled experimental setup [11, 12].
We develop two sets of studies in this paper. First, we start off by developing an
online controlled framework to question the longstanding notions of the magnitude of
peer signals as a reliable predictive factor of behavior diffusion. To this end, we develop
an experimental framework to characterize the exposure effect under multiple signals
but when the pattern of influence or PoI could be controlled (we show an example of
what a “pattern” is in Fig 1) - the experimental framework allows us to measure social
influence while avoiding confounding effects. It allows us to analyze how the signal
proportion when paired with its temporal treatment impacts the selection choices of
users in environments where the influence decision is not the best choice. The first
study was designed to avoid network effects as confounders in our understanding of peer
influence effect on behavior diffusion. Following this, in a separate second study, we
attempt at testing some of the rules obtained from our behavioral findings in the
controlled experiment on sub-optimal choice selections in networked environments in the
real world. We specifically try to measure the role of peer signals in networked
environments and in the presence of user uncertainty on diffusion of information with
questionable veracity. The objective of this second work is to understand the extent to
which our behavioral findings from the experimental data can be applied to
observational data - to this end we simulate spreading on real networks.
For our first work, we use Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to run an online,
controlled decision-making game and recruit participants for the game conducted over
several time steps. At each time step, participants selected one technology among 6
choices with differing utilities (only one among them was the optimal technology) - we
modulate the latter part of the game by subjecting participants to peer signals directed
towards a technology which was not optimal. We focus on understanding the effects of
PoI on the choices made by individuals in such a setting. While the first study relies on
experimental data, in our second work we adopt a data-driven approach to simulate
diffusion using multi-agent models but where the agents are mapped to real world users.
The diffusion model incorporates the rules of peer influence observed from the
experimental setup.
Our work has been influenced from existing studies on peer exposures and behavior
diffusion [13,14], however to the best of our knowledge, the extant work does not
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Fig 1: This illustration demonstrates a pattern of influence. At the first time step, one
among 6 neighbors of a user shares a message, in the following time step, another user
shares the same message and in the final step, two additional users. The user is thus
exposed to a “pattern” of social signals we represent as V = {1, 2, 4} for that message.
examine the effect of signal exposure when the signals promote sub-optimal choices. In
an observational study on the impact of repeated exposures on information
spreading [15], the authors show that an overwhelming majority of message samples are
more probable to be forwarded under repeated exposures, compared to those under only
a single exposure. However what is often understudied or left out in these research
studies is the sequential exposure mechanism or what we refer to as PoI in the paper.
Additionally, observing and mapping these PoI in the real world to analyze the cause
and effect synopsis is not straightforward because of the opacity problem [16].
Similarly, the experiment conducted in [17] reported that individual adoption is
much more likely when participants receive social reinforcement from multiple neighbors
in the social network relative to a single exposure, however it did not differentiate the
effects of network structure from the sequential exposure mechanism or what we refer to
as a pattern of influence. One of the main results from [17] show that the influence
monotonically increases, although the increased likelihood of influence from k signals
compared to k − 1 signals peaks when k=2. Our results, as summarized below, have the
following observations:
• We cluster participants in the online experiment into 5 groups - 2 control groups
and 3 treatment groups differing by the PoI or the pattern of information cascade
induced among the neighbors. Upon analyzing the selections made by participants
aggregated over the lifecycle of the game, we observe the following - compared to
participants who were treated to a single controlled sub-optimal peer signal
(reflecting the influence decision) over all time steps, the probability of selecting
that influence decision was significantly higher for participants who were treated
early to a large quantity of such controlled sub-optimal peer signals.
• Through multiple analyses on the effect of sequential peer exposures, we observe
that the number of exposures alone does not explain successful social influence
contrasting conclusions from several previous studies. Surprisingly, a delayed
stimulus in the form of sudden increase in peer signals is a more effective influence
strategy for later stages than peer signals administered through a uniform build
up when comparing the same time stage.
• Finally, as a step towards understanding how the rules from the behavioral
findings play out in real world diffusion, we develop data-driven agent based
models that simulate rumor diffusion. We use data to learn agent specific
parameters and evaluate the spreading dynamics of a group of questionable
information in Twitter networks. We find that while social influence based on
sequential exposures can result in faster diffusion compared to the factor of simply
the number of peer exposures, individual behavior uncertainty can also play an
important role that can impact the influence factor itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first discuss the related literature
underpinning this study in Section 2 and the hypotheses that we will investigate in
Section 3. We present the experimental setup and methods designed for measuring
social influence in Section 4. We analyze the controlled experiment results in Section 5.
Finally, we develop an agent based model drawing upon the conclusions of the controlled
experimental results and evaluate its results with real world data in Section 6.
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2 Related Work
Informational social influence, the tendency to accept information from others as
evidence about reality, tends to affect financial decision-making and product selection
more than other forms of social influence [18–20]. We are more often swayed by others’
decisions and behavior when we lack knowledge about the object of our decision, such
as when we must choose a product that we do not know much about, is not
well-described, or that we have little experience with [21]. This is because the
information we seek can be more cheaply acquired by observing others than by seeking
it ourselves. Conventional studies suggest that as the consensus of entities in a social
network increases – more signalers make the same signal – we assume that the
information peers are conveying is valid and we are more likely to adopt the signaled
behavior or decision [19,22]. The literature documents several influences on the
adoption of behaviors including network structure – who is connected to who and the
properties associated with these connections [17] – an individual’s information parsing
processes, their perceptions of product utility, and the number of signals they receive.
Number of signals
The relationship between the number of signals an individual receives in its network,
social influence, and the likelihood that said individual will adopt the behavior
indicated by the signals is closely related to the linear threshold model in which an
actor adopts a behavior after the signal count reaches an optimal threshold [23]. What,
though, is the impact of repeated signals on the decision-making process, and more
specifically how many signals are required to reliably influence an individual’s
decision-making? There are mixed findings regarding the benefit of multiple exposures
on the diffusion of information necessary to reach this threshold [24]. People may prefer
multiple confirmations from their peers to reassure themselves before making a
decision [15,25]. Experimental human studies using games from behavioral economics
like the Prisoner’s Dilemma tend to find that the impact of zero to three signalers
increases behavioral and decision-adoption in a linear fashion, and that a key threshold
for maximum social influence exists between four and five signalers. This means that
two signalers exert more influence than one, three exert more than two, and four to five
exert more influence than three. There is not much difference between the impact of
five and six or more. However, debate still exists – some have found the threshold to be
two signalers [26] while others report it at three [17,27]. Still, others have found the
reverse trend. In one study, repeated exposure to online signals in a social networking
site slowed the subsequent spread of information. This might affect decision-making and
behavioral adoption by inhibiting social influence [24,28].
Network Structure
A network structure’s describes characteristics of the network as a whole. This can
include properties like clustering/decentralization (to what degree do actors form ties),
modularity (how densely connected nodes are within clusters), homophily/heterophily
(similarity or dissimilarity of actors predicts tie-forming), and centralization (how
connected are actors). For instance, the density of a decision-maker’s social network can
influence the choices they make because signalers’ intentions are more ambiguous in
densely connected networks [29]. The dynamism, or how easily entities can move in and
out of networks, also influences decision-making. Social decision-making modelers have
found that the more dynamic and mobile a network, the greater concurrence of their
decisions in behavioral economics games [30,31]. Because the present studies are
primarily interested in the effects of a) the number of signals and b) the pattern by
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which they are received, we attempt to control for the effects of network structure by
holding the structure constant throughout all experimental conditions in both studies.
Please see Methods sections for further details.
Information Parsing
The manner in which individuals search for information affects their decision-making.
Individuals employ search strategies to reduce the number of choices [5]. This includes
revising their initial opinions by processing and averaging the different influences acting
on them [32] and social information provides one mechanism through which this is
achieved. These manners of decision making have also been linked to the concept of
dual process theory - the notion that two different systems of thought co-exist; a quick,
automatic, associative, and affective-based form of reasoning and a slow, thoughtful,
deliberative process [33]. Fast thinking involves conditions of “cognitive ease” and so
social influence factors into this process of slowing down the decision making system by
presenting alternating evidences for reconsideration. When social signals point towards
a specific outcome or opinion, individuals will often adopt the opinions and behaviors of
signalers [22,34], however while adopting behaviors based off social influence can be cost
effective, it does not always lead to the most effective or efficient decision. Individuals
must trade-off between trusting their own knowledge and trusting other’s opinions [13].
Biased social signals can influence individuals to choose wrong or less effective answers
in a variety of domains, particularly if multiple peers back the behavior or
decision [15,22,34].
Product Utility
When making product decisions, outcomes related to the quality and need for a product
change its the utility or perceived value and therefore the risk of the selection. For
instance, when decision-makers were asked to purchase songs in an online market where
they could see the decisions of other purchasers, the perceived quality of the songs
predicted their choices even when they witnessed peers purchasing songs of poor quality.
Songs of medium quality were most subject to effects of social influence [35]. The need
for a quality product also influences selection decisions. Kraut and colleagues found
that when deciding between different video-teleconferencing technologies, people with
the most communication intensive work – those who relied on video-teleconferencing the
most – placed greater value on the product’s ability than those with less need [4]. The
perceived value of a product predicts how much an individual will search for information
to inform their selection [21], and consumers and decision-makers are more likely to
engage in information search – including social information – when purchasing products
is risky – such as when the costs of making a sub-optimal choice are high – and when
they lack prior knowledge about the technology [21]. When we feel that we know enough
about a product, we believe that we already have enough information stored in memory
to make the best decision, and therefore additional social information is unnecessary.
3 The present research
We perform an online controlled experiment that manipulates the number of social
signals and the signal pattern over time. We hypothesize that successful social influence
requires more than just receiving signals or exposures to information from peers, as
both the utility of the technology and informational influences are at play. In our
experiment, any decision made produces varying degrees of monetary gain based on
utility. So, we speculate that successful social influence should be reflective of the
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mechanism through which information diffuses that ultimately instigates individuals to
change their beliefs and therefore their adoption behavior. We present the following two
hypotheses that we test in this paper with regards to the objective mentioned.
HYPOTHESIS H1. Individuals will be more likely to choose a sub-optimal
cyber-defense provider when they observe peers choosing the sub-optimal provider.
Through our first hypothesis, we try to examine the aggregated results of the
cascading exposure arising from varying temporal patterns of influence on the outcome
of interest - whether users follow the decision made by their peers. In this hypothesis,
time takes a backseat and we try to measure the extent to which early, uniform or
delayed exposure to peer influence can successfully achieve our desired outcome in
situations of sequential decision making when aggregated over all time steps of the
experiment. Subsequently, the hypothesis attempts to examine findings in [17] which
show that behaviors spread to a larger portion of the population in a clustered network,
indicating that additional social signals have significant effect on influence. However,
the results on behavior diffusion reported by this paper are heavily associated with the
clustered network organization that dictates the exposure to social influence and as such
the sequential nature of exposures and its effect was largely ignored in the study.
Following this, in another study on empirical data from Twitter [36], authors show that
the number of active neighbors is a positive indicator of influence, which is a similar
finding reported by [13,17]. In both these studies, the authors did not segregate varying
temporal influence patterns that might force users to revise their beliefs over time in
different manners. We build on these experiments to test the aggregated effect of the
peer signals and the extent to which the manner of signal dissemination among peers
can act as an impetus towards coercing users to change their decisions, especially when
users weigh their own private information against external influence.
HYPOTHESIS H2. The cascading pattern of peer signals or the temporal patterns
of influence will impact the adoption behavior of individuals more than just the quantity
of signals.
In this hypothesis, our goal is to understand whether the same quantity of peer
signals have different outcomes when individuals are subjected to them through
different cascading patterns. We again note that the authors in [17] conclude that the
likelihood of a user adopting a behavior at k signals compared to k − 1 signals was the
maximum when k=3. The authors attribute this to the clustered network organization
that allowed for users to receive multiple signals before they chose to adopt a behavior.
What we instead posit is that “time” has an important role to play in the revised beliefs
and opinions of individuals - an early exposure to peer influence can can result in a
substantially dynamics of adoption than situations where influence is delayed. We
deliberately downplay the role of networks to be able to control and study the nature of
cascading and we consider that all peers of an individual are homogeneous with respect
to the influence they can exert on it. This allows us to control the pattern of influence
i.e. the number of signals sent over each time step to an individual.
As we point out later, a successful social influence constitutes situations where
individuals not only deviate from the optimal decision but they also select the option
that majority of their peers choose.
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Table 1: Table of Symbols
Symbol Description
u a user or an agent
Cu influence decision for u
Nu number of times user u has adopted the influence
decision Cu in Ttreat
Au(t) number of peers of user u who have adopted Cu at
time t
di technology choice/decision i, i ∈ [1, 6] for the con-
trolled experiment
Du(t) decision or technology adopted by user u at time step
t
n number of individuals in a group in the controlled
experiment
Ttreat treatment phase of controlled experiment, time steps
13 to 18 in our setting
G = (V,E) a network G consisting of nodes V and edges E, V (G)
denotes subset of vertices relevant to network G.
pu(t) probability of user u adopting a sub-optimal decision
at time t
µu(t) utility obtained by user u upon choosing the optimal
decision at time t
ζu(t) utility obtained by user u upon choosing the influence
decision Cu at time t
zu(t) binary variable that assumes value 1 if user u chooses
Cu at time t, else zero
ηu, βu Agent specific parameters in the ABM model
q, Vq information cascade and the users/nodes participat-
ing in q
DFq[t] Diffusion node set for cascade q obtained at time step
t from our ABM simulation
4 Methods
The following protocol was approved by Human Studies Board at Sandia National
Laboratories. To test our hypotheses, we ran an online, controlled decision-making
game in which participants took on the role of a security officer at a bank. Participants
were told that they and several of their peers at different banks were being asked to
invest in a cyber-defense technology provider once a month for 18 time steps or time
steps. We separated participants into 5 groups based on pattern of social signal
exposure which will be described in details in the Design subsection following this. At
each time step, participants were able to choose from 6 different technology providers -
among which only one was optimal, preventing 7 attacks. The remaining 5 providers
prevented 5 attacks each (from that perspective, all sub-optimal technologies had the
same utility). For every attack they prevented in any time step, participants received
$0.02 (so, a participant could thus receive a maximum $1.14 in each time step). Thus,
they were incentivized to avoid more attacks and earn more money. This information
about the optimal and sub-optimal providers is not available to the participants at the
beginning of the game. Additionally, all participants could view brief descriptions of
provider capabilities – e.g. one of them being “Secure.com utilizes algorithmic computer
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Fig 2: Example screen in the cyber-defense provider selection task. Participants in the
Uniform Messages (UM) condition of the study have access to a screen that looked like
this. The Feedback section displays the number of attacks the participant prevented
after each time step. The Decisions section displays the 6 provider choices that it
has. Finally, the Messages section is displayed after time step 12, from where on the
participants can view what their peers selected in the previous time step.
threat detection to keep systems safe. It prides itself on its efficiency and success rate in
warding against attacks.”
4.1 Design
Participants were randomly assigned to five groups with each group having unique
members not involved in decision making as part of other groups. The entire game was
partitioned into two phases. For the first phase comprising 12 time steps, no other
information but a short excerpt about six potential providers was given. After the
participants made their selection for a given time step, they saw the number of attacks
their provider had prevented in that step. As mentioned earlier, in the absence of the
knowledge of the utilities of the technology providers (or the number of attacks it
prevents), the first 12 time steps allow for individual decision making and exploration.
In the second phase of the experiment which started at time step 13, we introduced
interventions by allowing participants access to extra information from 6 other
individuals which are supposedly their peers (and which are bots controlled by us).
After participants make their choice at a time step, they can view the selections made
by their peers in the previous time step. Each participant in the all groups bar one are
subjected to 6 peers - we call the decisions of these peers that the participant views in
the second phase as peer signals in this work. Fig 2 shows the screen of a participant
from time steps 13 to 18 when they were able to view the decision of their peers. The
platform was hosted by the Controlled Large Online Social Experimentation (CLOSE)
platform and developed at Sandia National Laboratories [37]. While the participant is
able to view the technology selections of all its peers at each time step, we control social
influence by administering a randomly selected sub-optimal technology Cu (among the 5
providers) through the peers of the participant u - so using our nomenclature, Cu is the
influence decision for u. For each u, this technology Cu was selected as the choice that
would be disproportionately signaled by its peers over time (this pattern of influence or
PoI would be manipulated by us). The motivation behind this deliberate selection of
sub-optimal Cu (controlled by us) as the influence decision is to investigate whether
participants would be tempted to select this technology Cu in the presence of its peer
feedback. Note that we attempt to avoid network effects by randomizing this technology
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Fig 3: The signal vs time step plots for the 4 patterns - note that for the NM group
(not shown here), no peer signal in the form of pre-selected sub-optimal technologies
were sent to the participants at any time step.
or the influence decision Cu specific to the user u - this allows us to avoid any
deliberate collisions among peer choices of different users that could be representative of
network effects in the real world.
We denote by Au(t) the number of peers of the participant u, who we administer the
sub-optimal technology/influence decision Cu at time step t (so Au(t) ≤ 6). We now
describe the pattern of influence V dropping the subscripts to generalize for all users or
PoI as we denote it, for the 5 groups (the first 2 being the control groups for comparison
with the next 3 treatment groups) (Fig 3 shows the signal patterns for the groups):
1. No Message (NM): Participants receive no message from the peers, so the last six
time step are exactly same for the participants as the first 12.
2. Uniform Message (UM): Here we send C using one peer of a participant at each
time step. So A = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} denotes uniform influence.
3. Linear Cascade (LC): Here we incrementally activate one peer with the
technology C at each time step. So A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} denotes uniformly
increasingly influence as shown in Fig 4.
4. Delayed Cascade (DC): Here we send only one signal for the first 3 time steps and
send 4, 5 and 6 signals at the last 3 time steps in order. So A = {1, 1, 1, 4, 5, 6}.
The objective is to see whether the sudden change in the number of signals acts as
a catalyst for successful influence at the later stages of the experiment.
5. Early Cascade (EC):In this setup, we send higher magnitude of signals from the
beginning setting A = {4, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6}. This pattern allows us to ask if an early
trigger is able to sustain the levels of influence, or whether participants will return
to the optimal choice at the later stages.
Accordingly, Au(t) would be different for users in each group, for e.g. for a u in LC
group, Au(t = 1) = 1, Au(t = 2) = 2 while for EC group, Au(t = 1)=4, Au(t = 2)=5
and so on. An example of the linear cascade setting is shown in Fig 4, where a
participant receives social signals from its six neighbors - our influence decision C
uniformly cascades through the peers of the participant.
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Fig 4: Illustration of the linear cascade diffusion. The technology Cu chosen by us as
the sub-optimal technology (influence decision for user u (in dots) cascades through the
peers of u over the 6 time steps. Colored nodes denote the activated peers with respect
to Cu (manually preprogrammed by us) at each time step. Note that although at time
steps starting at 13 and ending at 18, there are subjects (uncolored) among peers who
have not adopted Cu, their selections (which may not be Cu) are visible to u. However,
which users among the peers have been preprogrammed manually is by default unknown
to the target subject u.
At time step 13 (start of the second phase), a signaler u selects a sub-optimal
provider Cu, and over the next five time steps, the remaining peers adopt the same
influence decision one after another. Note that although we program only selected peers
(bots) of a subject to administer Cu over time, the subjects are able to view all their
peers’ decisions in their dashboard for all the last 6 time steps - the rest of the
non-controlled peers at a time step show random technologies to the participant. Also,
note that in all conditions, users can switch back to any choice in the next time step
after having selected an option in the current time step. We consider the NM and UM
groups as our baseline groups and LC, EC, DC groups as our treatments groups of
interest.
For both the hypotheses H1 and H2, the outcomes of interest are the decisions made
by participants in the last six time steps, in the presence of social signals from peers. We
explore whether decision-makers will be more likely to choose cyber-defense providers
which are not the optimal choice when they have knowledge about the utilities and
when they observe peers opting for choices which are not optimal. We note that people
get feedback about their choice on the very next screen—and so choosing a technology
during an intermediate time step is more of a data-gathering exploration rather than
their final choice. In order to allow for this initial bandwidth for exploration, we keep
the first 12 time steps ( time steps) same for all subjects devoid of any interference This
helps in overcoming bias related to an individual’s own knowledge about the utilities in
the second phase of the experiment when they are treated to social signals.
4.2 Participants
We recruited a total of 357 participants for this study to play the same cyber-defense
provider game. Based on the responses provided by the participants regarding their
demographics in the form of a survey response1, we have 151 males and 190 males in
the study. Most of our participants are in the age group of 26-35 years and full details
regarding their age groups have been provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix A in ??.
Additionally, majority of the participants in our experiment had a Bachelor’s degree and
details have been provided in the Appendix. Participants were paid $2 with the
opportunity to earn up to $4.52 since as mentioned before, they received a bonus of
$0.02 for every attack they prevented. Thus, the participants have a motivation to
prevent more attacks in order to earn more money. Some of the participants did not
1Some participants declined to provide a response regarding their demographics
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complete the full length of the game and so we observe slight discrepancies among the
group sample sizes for the statistical tests.
Group # participants
Average number of attacks
prevented (std. deviation)
NM 55 104.77 (10.99)
UM 71 106.44 (9.46)
LC 79 103.87 (9.91)
DC 81 104.87 (8.39)
EC 71 103.50 (8.38)
Table 2: Average number of attacks prevented by subjects in each group. The lower
attacks suggest participants deviated more from the optimal decision responding to
social influence.
5 Analysis
5.1 Distribution of attacks prevented
Table 2 shows the distribution of attacks prevented by subjects in each group. We
observe that, on average subjects in the EC and LC groups prevent less attacks
compared to others. However based on 2 sampled t-test, we did not find any
statistically significant differences between the groups based on the means of the
distributions. Based on a survey analysis, we found that none of the traits like
computer anxiety, computer confidence, computer liking, intuition or neuroticism were
correlated to the number of attacks prevented in all groups. The details of the survey
analysis is presented in Appendix A in ??.
5.2 Distributions of decisions by individuals
As a first step towards investigating hypothesis H1, we analyze the kinds of social
signals or the cyber security technologies (which were not the optimal technology)
chosen by the peers of each participant and whether they are uniform across all the
groups. To simplify nomenclature hereon, we denote the 6 available technology choices
as decision di, i ∈ [1, 6]. In our experimental setup and for this work throughout, we
would refer to d1 as the influence decision - it is the optimal choice preventing 7 attacks,
while the rest of the technologies prevented 5 attacks and are being termed as
sub-optimal choices. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the influence decision Cu ∈ [d2, d6] is
randomized for each u, so we first observe the distribution of the sub-optimal decisions
as the choices for Cu. For each group, we define P (di) =
|{u | Cu=di}|
|u| as the proportion
of users in the group who were administered technology or decision di, i ∈ [2, 6] as the
influence decision in the second phase. From Fig 5, we observe that the random
selection of Cu introduces some disproportionate values of P (di) among the groups. For
UM group, around 25% of users were administered d4 as the influence decision Cu (this
proportion P (d4) for UM is the highest among all other decisions) while 29% of users in
the EC group were sent d5 (P (d5) being the highest for EC) as their infuence decisions
Cu and 28% of users in the DC were sent d5 (P (d5) being the highest for DC). However,
we see that for LC group, P (di) was similar for all decisions di that could be selected as
Cu.
Having observed that there was not one pre-programmed peer choice Cu as the
strategical obvious sub-optimal choice across all groups, we proceed with investigating
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Fig 5: P (di) - proportion of users in each group who were administered technology or
decision di as the influence decision. Note that only the decisions that are not optimal
are sent as prospective influence decisions/social signals in the second phase of the
experiment.
H1. In order to detect any implicit occurrence of a selection bias over the participants,
we analyze whether there is any significant difference in the groups with respect to
choices made in the first 12 time steps. To accomplish that, we plot the probability that
an individual makes each decision when aggregated over the first 12 time steps. We find
that there is clearly no evidence of differences in the mean statistics of the distributions
of all choices between the treatments groups (LC, DC, EC) and the control groups (UM,
NM) (Refer to Fig 1 in Appendix B in ??). Before we conduct pairwise t-tests to check
for differences between the control and treatment groups for the decision distributions
made by the participants in the second phase, we conducted three one-way ANOVA
tests considering the sample means of the two control groups and each treatment group,
one at a time. We conducted these 3 tests for each decision from decision 1 to decision
6. The null hypothesis for each test constituted the situation where the means of the
number of times a decision was chosen by the participants belonging to the 2 control
groups and one of the treatment groups, are the same for the technology or decision in
consideration. We find the following significant results: for the LC group, we find that
for d4, the null hypothesis is rejected (F (2, 203) = 3.7, p = .03). Similarly for the DC
group, we reject the null hypothesis for d4 as well (F (2, 205) = 3.01, p = .04) and for
the EC group, we find differences approaching statistical significance for d5
(F (2, 195) = 2.99, p = .05). We will come back to this case of EC group shortly while
discussing the differences. These tests shed light on the differences in adoptions between
the control and treatment groups that occurred in the second phase of the experiment
in the presence of social signals.
Following this, we conducted 2-sampled t-tests to measure the differences in the
distributions of decisions adopted by users between pairs of control and treatment
groups. We conducted two sets of tests for the two phases of the experiments. The null
hypothesis constituted the situation where the means of the decision selection
distributions of the two groups being tested for, are not different. The results (p-values
for each treatment group with respect to the control groups) in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in
Appendix C in ?? suggest no significant difference in the distributions among the
groups. This rules out any bias among the participants themselves in the absence of
externalities. However, in the second phase of the experiment ( time steps 13 to 18
aggregated), we find differences in the selection patterns among the decision-makers in
their respective groups. We find the following observations from Figs 6(a) and (b) for
our treatment groups (ssee Tables in Appendix C in ?? ):
1. LC: With respect to the NM group, there are no statistically significant
differences in the decisions taken by the participants in LC - we carried out a
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(b)
Fig 6: Probability of decisions made in time steps 13 to 18. (a) Probability of making
the optimal decision. (b) Probability of making the sub-optimal (other 5) decision. The
error bars denote standard error over the distributions.
similar statistical test comparing the group pairwise means as done for the first 12
steps. On the other hand, we find that there is a statistically significant difference
for the LC group participants (M = 3, SD = 2.4) in the means of the
distributions compared to the UM group participants (M = 3.8, SD = 2.53) for
the optimal decision or d1 (t(149) = 1.9, p = .04) at α = 0.05. The difference
shows that a significantly less number of participants are tempted to choose the
optimal technology provider in the presence of linear cascading signal pattern
than when a single signal is sent across all time steps.
2. DC: When considering the number of times participants choose d4, we find that
the participants in the DC group (M = 0.58, SD = 1.08), differ from UM group
(M = 0.30, SD = 0.61) and this difference is statistically significant
(t(155) = −2.02, p = .04). However, with respect to NM group or UM group
participants, we observe that the users do not differ in their selections when it
comes to choosing the optimal provider. Also it does not differ with respect to the
most common choice among the peers for DC group - the decision 6 shown in
Fig 5.
3. EC: When we considering the choice of d5, the technology that was administered
to majority of the EC group participants, the users in this group
(M = .79, S = 1.08) differ from the NM group (M = 0.38, SD = 0.66) in its
selection and the difference is significant (t(128) = −2.7, p = .007). We found
similar significant results from our ANOVA tests prior to this analysis and this is
a successful case of social influence when considering the macro-adoption process
for the group as the users not only steered away from the optimal choice, but they
also steered towards the decision of their peers.
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Fig 7: Fraction of users in each group adopting the influence decision chosen by their
peers.
This suggests that while the social signal to some extent influences an individual in
the LC group to deviate from the optimal choice, it does not always translate to the
influence decision that was chosen for the corresponding individual. It rather gears the
user towards more exploration. However, an early burst of signals in the EC successfully
translates towards social influence wherein on aggregate majority of the users sway
towards the influence decision more. As a side experiment to measure the degree of drift
away from optimal decision, we also analyze the fraction of users who shift away from d1
(the optimal) at each time step similar to what has been shown in Fig 7. However, we
do not find any clear distinctions among the groups in terms of the fraction of subjects
who move away from optimal decision when aggregated over all the 6 time steps in the
second phase - just the fact that all users eventually move away from the optimal
decision when exposed to social signals does not contribute much in distinguishing the
PoI.
5.3 Degree of Influence
This first analysis of H1 does not shed any light on the temporal variations in the
decision making process exhibited by users in different groups - it shows some
statistically significant differences in the choices made for specific decisions (or
technology providers) over the entire second phase. While it did show that not all
cascade patterns successfully influenced users towards deviating from “decision1” or the
optimal provider, it brings up the question that is posed for hypothesis H2: what
constitutes successful influence and if so, does the manner in which the signals are sent
determine successful influence?
To this end, we analyze how the proportion of users who switch to the influence
decision ignoring the optimal choice, evolves over the times steps. We note that for each
user u, the influence decision Cu is randomly selected before the second phase starts.
Fig 7 shows the fraction of users in each group adopting the influence decision from
time steps 13 to 18, when the experimental participants observe their peers’ decisions.
Following from the observations regarding H1, we find that the probability of successful
influence for participants in EC has the strongest effects on decision-making in the early
stages of the second phase. Participants in EC are most likely to deviate from selecting
the optimal provider as shown in Fig 6 - for the first 3 time steps in the second phase,
participants in EC group exhibit the maximum adoption compared to other groups
denoted by higher fraction of adopted participants. Additionally, for the EC group.
time step 15 had the maximum retention where 35% of users adopted their peer
behavior, and when participants were exposed to all their 6 peers selecting the same
technology Cu - this may be due to new users adopting the influence decision or due to
cumulative build-up from previous time steps who do not switch back. We will explore
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this in the following sections.
The participants in the DC group exhibit successful response towards the sudden
increase in signals at time step 16 whic is shown by a 65% increase in user adoption of
the influence decision compared to the previous step. These results become close to the
25% of users making influence decision selection at time step 16 and which is also the
maximum among all groups surpassing the early cascade adoption ratio. However, there
is no substantial increase in the adoption fraction for the users in the linear cascade
group - we do note that the adoption peaks at time step 15 for the linear cascade users
before it drops again. These observations from Fig 6 and Fig 7 suggest that while an
early burst of social signals successfully persuades users in EC to adopt the influence
decision, causing an aggregated overall maximum selection of the influence decision, a
sudden impulse in the quantity of social influence also successfully steers users towards
the influence decision in the later stages.
5.4 Measuring the effect of quantity of signals
In this section, we investigate whether the quantity of signals alone stand out as the sole
factor of influence. Before going into the analysis, we define a few notations: we denote
a subject in this study as u where u can belong to any group. We denote the decision
taken by a subject u at time t, t ∈ [1, 18] by Du(t). We define Ttreat as the sequence of
time points during which the subjects receive signals from their peers i.e.
Ttreat = [13, 18]. Following this, we denote the time step t, t ∈ Ttreat when an
individual u first switches to Cu as t
f
u. For each signal quantity s, we measure the
proportion of individuals (in each group) who made their first switch to their influence
decision only after they were exposed to s signals. Formally, for any t ∈ Ttreat,
R(s) =
|{u | Du(t)=Cu
∧
Au(t)=s
∧
t=tfu}|
|{u}| (R(1) in LC group denotes the proportion of
individuals in LC group who made their first switch to their peer influence decision
after being exposed to just 1 signal. Similarly, R(6) in EC group denotes the proportion
of individuals in EC group who made their first switch to their peer influence decision
only after being exposed to 6 signals, so this can happen in any of the last 4 time steps
in EC). The denominator in the formula here denotes the number of individuals in the
group.
We bin the values from R(s) based on s and take the mean for each group, since for
some groups, there can be multiple time steps with the same number of exposures or
signals. From Fig 8(a), we observe that for EC group, ∼30% of users under the
influence of 4 signalers, for DC, ∼18% of users at 4 signalers and for LC, ∼15% of users
at 3 signalers (all these being the maximum ratio) made their first switch to the
influence decisions in the second phase of the experiment. However, on close observation,
we find that the number of exposures alone does not explain the adoption behavior.
When we compare the EC participants with those in DC group, we find that with 4
exposures in Ttreat (at time step 13 for EC and at time step 16 for DC), the proportion
of adopters in EC making their first influence decision switch (30% of users) is higher
than the proportion in DC (18% of users), although the same 4 quantity of signals are
delivered at different time steps for the 2 groups. However, while there is a constant
decrease in the number of adopters making first switches in the EC group going from 4
to 6 exposures denoted by the corresponding mean R(s), we see that the same quantity
for the DC group does not decrease the same way for 4 to 5 to 6 exposures. This
suggests that the sudden stimulus from the delayed exposure somehow succeeds in
influencing more users to make their first switch to the influence decision compared to
the EC group (note that all the users under the quantity R(s) for each s are unique
since we measure their first switch). On the other hand, for the linear cascade group we
do not find one quantity that is most effective in the influence - in the LC setup, there
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Fig 8: Plots of adoption under the influence of s exposures. (a) For each signal quantity
s, proportion of individuals who made their first switch to their influence decision after
being exposed to s signals, (b) Proportion of individuals who adopt their influence
decision after being exposed to signals from s influence signals
.
is no one exposure that impacts the adoption behavior the most in terms of successful
influence. In addition, we measure the cumulative adoption ratio for each group defined
as: for any t ∈ Ttreat, Z(s) = |{u | Du(t)=Cu
∧
Au(t)=s}|
|{u}| . In simple terms, it measures
the number of individuals in a group who adopt the influence decision under s
exposures irrespective of whether it is the first switch. This is demonstrated in Fig 8(b).
When we combine the results obtained in Fig 8(a) with Fig 8(b), we find an interesting
observation for the LC group. The linear cascade pattern is able to retain most of the
users even after first switch at time step 13 as the cumulative ratio increases up to 3
exposures (which occurs at time step 15). This suggests that the LC pattern is effective
in terms of retention in the early stages of the cascade.
5.5 Quantitative analysis using Growth Modeling
To understand the patterns of change over time by incorporating the heterogeneity
among individuals in each group and among the groups, we resort to the widely used
statistical tool of growth modeling through random coefficient models [38]. Briefly, the
technique of growth modeling allows us to test the longitudinal effects of the peer
signals on the users and test any source of heterogeneity in decision making among
individuals that lead to the observed outcomes. One of the advantages of growth
modeling comes from treating time as a predictor of influence outcome in the absence
and presence of the peer signals. The error-covariance matrix from these models inform
us about the variations among the individuals in the presence and absence of peer
signals over the phases of the experiment.
We utilize 4 regression models where the outcome of interest denotes whether an
individual selected the influence decision Cu(t) at time t in the second phase of the
experiment. Let the linear predictor, η be the combination of the fixed and random
effects excluding the residuals. Considering a linear mixed effects model LMEM
y = Xβ +Uχ+ , where y ∈ Rk, (and k = n ∗ [t]) denotes the outcome response of
individuals over all time points t ∈ [1, [t]] - k thus denotes the number of instances in
the model. In this work, we have [t]= [Ttreat]=6. X ∈ Rk×f denotes the design matrix
of endogenous variables, f being the number of predictors, U ∈ Rk×w denotes the
matrix with random effects (the random complement to the fixed X), w being the
number of predictors with random effects ,  denotes the residuals, and β and χ are the
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Linear Cascade Delayed Cascade Early Cascade
Time Signals Inter. Time Signals Inter. Time Signals Inter.
M0-FE 0.08
(0.07)
-1.79
(0.28)
0.32
(0.08)
-3.08
(0.36)
-0.12
(0.06)
-0.67
(0.24)
M1-RE 0.07
(0.03)
-1.91
(0.12)
0.32
(0.03)
-3.23
(0.13)
-0.13
(0.03)
-0.69
(0.11)
M2-RE 0.05
(.03)
-1.83
(.12)
0.29
(.03)
-3.15
(.13)
-0.15
(.03)
-0.63
(.11)
M3-RE -0.02
(.27)
0.29
(.23)
-1.87
(.96)
-0.37
(.029)
0.44
(.074)
-0.23
(.025)
-0.23
(0.12)
0.29
(.25)
-0.28
(.42)
Table 3: Results of Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) modeling. “Inter.”
denotes intercept in the regression models. Values in brackets denote standard errors.
parameters of interest corresponding to the fixed effects and the random effects in the
model. Since the outcome in our work is binary, we use Generalized Linear Mixed
Effects models (GLMEM) [39] in this work. In a GLMEM model, we use the same
equation as LMEM but with a linear predictor η such that η = Xβ +Uχ+  where
g(E[y]) = η, g(.) being the link function. To accommodate for the binary outcomes, we
use the logit link function. To quantify the effects using growth modeling, for each
individual, we use the following regression models for modeling the growth functions:
M0− FE : ηi = [β00 + β10(Timei)] + i (1)
M1−RE : ηij = [β00 + β10(Timeij ] + χ0j + ij (2)
M2−RE : ηij = [β00 + β10(Timeij ] + [χ0j + χ1j(Timeij)] + ij (3)
M3−RE : ηij = [β00 + β10(Timei) + β20(Signalsi)] + [χ0j + χ1j(Timei)] + ij (4)
where the indices i denote the observation instance number (or the row number in a
table of data) and j denotes the individual in the group of all users. So, M0-FE
represents the fixed effects model where the only independent variable is the time.
Intuitively, this model just tests how individual responses to peer signals evolve over
time, when time itself is the only factor in consideration. From the results in Table 3, we
find that among the 3 treatment groups, the probability of outcome is most positively
correlated with time for the Delayed Cascade group. This simple regression model
ignores the fact that the observations are nested within individuals and accordingly, the
next step in growth modeling is to add a component of random intercept to the model -
this is denoted by M1-RE. Note that in this model, the random intercept χ0j is
specific to each individual j. On comparing the parameter estimates, we find that the
time coefficient β10 remains similar for both models even after incorporating
between-person differences for all the groups. This shows that time is significantly
correlated to the outcome in the absence of the knowledge of peer signal treatment.
Next, we add the “Time” variable to the random components, so that time can
randomly vary among the users. This is denoted by the model M2-RE given by
Equation 3. The correlation between the slope and intercept for this model for the LC,
DC and EC groups are respectively 0.7, 0.7 and 0.4 respectively. The positive
correlation indicates that individuals whose have a high propensity to move towards the
influence decision in the beginning tend to have strong slopes - this weakly suggests
that individuals with some degree of uncertainty towards optimal decision at the
beginning tend to be more susceptible to influence over time. Following this, we now
explore the idea that “Signals” have a role to play on the outcome of the individuals.
We add to M2-RE, the fixed effects from Signals shown in M3-FE. From the results in
Table 3, we find that for all the 3 groups, the number of signals is positively correlated
May 27, 2020 17/40
Fig 9: Success Ratio.
with the outcome while the time factor is now being negatively correlated for the groups.
Among all the groups we find that for the DC group, the Signals factor has the highest
coefficient suggesting the strong correlation between the treatment with signals and the
outcome. These results suggest the positive correlation of the treatment of signals on
the outcome when time has an important role to play - the interaction between time
and signals are important here given that the correlation of time changes once the effect
of signals is considered.
5.6 Interplay between influence and susceptibility
We end this study with a retrospective analysis to understand the dynamics of adoption
under a slightly relaxed setting. In real-world networks, not all individuals would be
susceptible to social change emanating from their neighborhood, some people have
stronger beliefs than others [40]. In an attempt to quantify the effect of the influence on
subjects in a more constrained setting, we consider only those users u who have been
influenced to adopt the influence decision Cu at least once between time steps 13 to 18
in the second phase. We measure at every time step, the ratio of individuals who
adopted the influence decision at that time step to the number of individuals in the
group they belong to, who switched to their influence decision at least once within their
lifecycle (Ttreat). Note that this is different from previous measures in 2 ways: first we
retrospectively filter out users who never adopted their influence decision (in the real
world these are users who would not be susceptible to influence or are immune as such).
Second, we analyze this ratio at the end of their exploration phase, in time step 18,
when everybody have supposedly settled down. We define a symbol Nu as the number
of time steps for which a user u adopts Cu in Ttreat (this is measured retrospectively
aggregating all time steps beforehand). Formally it is defined as: Success ratio(t) =
|{u | Du(t)=Cu}|
|{u | Nu≥1}| . The denominator denotes the number of individuals who have adopted
the influence decision at least once from time steps 13 to 18. The comparison shown in
Fig 9 among the four groups (the No message group does not have any influence
decision) demonstrates that while the EC group adopts the influence decision more
quickly than other groups, the stimulus in signals quantity at time step 16 in DC group
affected the participants. This is confirmed when the effects of DC strongly outstrip
those observed from EC in the last time step where both groups receive 6 signals. At
the end of the game, at time step 18, we find that the highest number of such
susceptible individuals come from the DC group - these results reinforce some of the
conclusions we had from Section 5.3 and Fig 7 regarding the late retention capabilities
of the DC group strategy - however, this measure makes the differences clearer when we
consider individuals who are more prone to social influence.
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6 Data-driven computational models
In this second study, we extend our work on understanding the behavioral aspect of
responses to social influence in sub-optimal choice diffusion settings to real world
scenarios where the distinction between the utilities among choices may not be outright
evident. Additionally, as mentioned in the introduction, it is generally not easy to
observe these patterns of influence at scale and also in networked settings in the real
world which makes it difficult to study the effects it might have on behavior diffusion.
The opaque nature of the effect of exposures in the real world responsible for influence
makes it more difficult to analyze the characteristics of these PoI - the fact that the
data about who-exposed-whom in real world information cascades is rarely available
makes studying peer influence more challenging [16]. To this end, we try to bridge the
gap between experimental hypothesis and real world scenarios by trying to model the
behavior of agents or users when subject to peer influences and by capturing the
sequential nature and bursts in influences towards diffusion. We take the case of rumor
diffusion when the piece of information that propagates as a rumor turns out to be false.
In such cases, the action of resharing by individuals is sub-optimal from the perspective
of information sharing. In such situations, social influence plays an important role in
persuading individuals with benign intent towards resharing when in fact these
individuals might otherwise be reluctant to participate. We observe the trade-off
between individual decisions and the influence decision through the cascading effect
from peers in such environments where resharing a message would be the wrong choice.
While the growth models in Section 5.5 provided us with evidence about the
importance of signals across time for the 3 treatment groups, the analysis from
Section 5.4 showed that the compounding effect of influence can lead to different
probability outcomes. Specifically, we find that the number of signals as the proxy for
influence can have different effects when it comes to users adopting the influence
decision - we observe the values of R(s) being different among the LC and the EC
groups for the same s signals despite them being administered at the same steps of the
game. This non-markovian nature of influence calls for developing models that not only
take the effect of the magnitude of peer signals into account but its effect relative to
what the user has been exposed to so far across the time steps thus far. However,
observing such influence patterns can be non-trivial when it comes to mapping and
filtering these chains of patterns in real world cascades. The challenge is exacerbated
when we try to weigh the users’ private information against the factor of influence - we
do not observe these private cognitive factors in real world data which makes it more
difficult to understand the real world implications of our experimental conclusions.
To this end, we define our models of influence where in we take into account the
impact of sequential exposures and perform simulations of the spread of adoption using
an influence based multi-agent model on real world data. This would also help us
measure the extent to which the observations from our controlled setup can be
replicated in real world cases through simulations. Our agent based model (ABM)
differs from the traditional models of diffusion in that (1) agents as influencers are
homogeneous unlike in traditional models, where each influencer has its own
contribution towards the group influence function and therefore in our case, pairwise
influences between users and their peers are similar for all peers and (2) behavior
diffusion in the simulation is directed towards sub-optimal decision making where the
choice of following peers or the influence decision may not be the optimal decision.
6.1 Simulation setup for ABM
There are two ways in which we can model agent behavior to simulate behavior
diffusion - the single agent behavioral model which predicts individual behavior when
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(a) Single agent behavior model
(b) Multi-agent behavior simulation
Fig 10: Agent based models for measuring social influence with multiple choices. (a)
Single agent behavior model, (b) Multi-agent behavior simulation
individuals are observed in isolation and the multi agent behavioral model that extends
the single agent behavioral model to a population level by executing the simulation in a
multi-agent environment. In such scenarios, since the agents influence each other
through their own actions over a period of time, the behavior of individuals can no
longer be measured without taking the environmental factors into account. Fig 10(a)
shows the agent based model for a single agent where an agent makes a decision based
on its utilities at every time step. Once the utilities have been determined, the agent
picks a decision corresponding to the maximum utility. Once the agent has acted, the
environment is updated and external factors that might also impact the agent’s decision
in the next step is accounted for. Prior to the next time step, the utilities of the choices
are updated based on the previous decision. However in this lifecycle of the decision
making process, the agent is observed in isolation.
In our work, we use this single-agent behavior model as a generative element to
simulate agent behavior but we observe the behavior at a population level especially
when the agents influence each other by making actions and by virtue of being in a
networked environment. In order to simulate and evaluate the effect of social influence
through multiple exposures in the real world, we choose a specific real world case study
to implement the environment. As shown in Fig 10(b) which represents the multi-agent
behavioral model lifecycle, agent behavior is simulated using the single agent behavior
model in Fig 10(a) with specific input parameters for the agent which would be learnt
from the empirical data. We run the ABM and evaluate the results from the ABM
using different training and test splits but from the same distribution of the empirical
data. The agent specific parameters are learnt prior to the start of the simulation
iterations since we map the agents to real world users. Although we do not use feedback
from the evaluation obtained from one run of the simulation from the real world to
optimize the simulation environment for future runs, this step can be additionally
performed to obtain monotonically increasing evaluation performance. In our
environment, each agent has a choice to reshare a piece of information in the situation
where resharing is not the optimal choice. We now describe the agents and their choices
in details in the following subsections.
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6.2 Agents
In our multi-agent simulation environment, the agents and the users in the social
network of the real world are one-one mappings and so by default the agents are
embodied in a networked environment where they can now share and be exposed to
others’ messages. We model a social network as a directed graph N = (V,E), where a
node v ∈ V represents and individual and the edge (u, v) ∈ E exists if u follows v, in
our case v influences u’s decision. So in the context of this social network, our agents
are the nodes in these networks. Each agent can play both the role of a neighbor
influencing a user or a susceptible user who is being influenced. For each agent u, as
mentioned before, we consider the set of agent’s peers to be homogeneous with respect
to the influence they exert on u. In the context of the ABM, we separately model the
probability that each agent is being influenced based on factors that we are going to
discuss in the next section.
6.3 Modeling agent behavior towards sub-optimal decision
making
Instead of considering multiple choices for the agent decision stages, we consider a
binary choice model where at each time step, each agent has to make a selection among
two choices which are reciprocal to each other, and the selection is based off on the
choice that comes with the higher probability of activation. In the real world case study
used for the simulation, the action of resharing a piece of information is a sub-optimal
choice and so the peers of an agent who reshared the same piece of information, are
going to exert influence towards sub-optimal decision making.
Also, note that this is a simpler version of the online controlled experimental setup
where the user had 5 choices and only one of them was optimal and our setup can be
extended to include multiple choices for a relevant real world case study. Following this,
the agent can only be in two states based on the choice it makes, that is it has either
reshared a piece of information identifying the cascade or it has not. Additionally, as in
most real world adoption scenarios with a binary choice model, the user cannot
transition back to the state it arrived from. Before delving into the technical details of
the components for the agent utilities, agent states and the exposure effect based ABM,
we describe in details how we quantify the individual decision factor and the peer
influence through exposures.
6.3.1 Probability of activation
The agent in our model starts with being agnostic about whether the choice of resharing
a message or the activation choice is the optimal choice, however it is in the interest of a
rational actor to make a choice that is optimal in the real world, yet conform to the
general choices made by the population. So in the absence of any external factors, our
model posits that the probability that agent u makes a sub-optimal decision is given by:
pu(t) =
1
1 + exp(−(ζu(t)− µu(t))) (5)
where µu(t) denotes the negative utility from the agent u’s own decision to select the
optimal choice at time t using its acquired knowledge of the real world event (this
quantity represents the utilities from the knowledge acquired by users in the first phase
of the controlled experiment) i.e. it represents the cost from disagreeing with the
dominant influence decision which is not optimal, ζu(t) denotes the utility that comes
from selecting the peer choice Cu. An important point to note here is that while µu(t)
denotes the loss from selecting the optimal decision, the utility ζu(t) denotes the utility
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from adopting the influence decision and we incorporate that in the function definition
described later. So pu(t) here denotes the probability of selecting the sub-optimal
decision which is key to the way we handle the simulation later.
We note that unlike other propagation models [41–43], we do not consider external
effects for the propagation like infectiousness parameter of the cascade, time of the day
as those factors can be added to our ABM model as well the baselines we use to
measure the effect of exposures as a proxy for influence. The goal of this ABM model
based simulation of spread is two fold: (1) we measure the extent to which the
spreading on real world networks based on the exposure effect from our model differs
from that of the Bass model and which was the basis of the controlled experiment
in [17] which considers only the number of active individuals (using the network
structure to diffuse signals) at a time as a measure of influence, and (2) how close the
results obtained from the spreading simulation are to real world diffusion. We repeat
that any other external factors that influence adoption can be added to our model to
improve the fit to real world data - however we test exposure rates for social influence
as opposed to just active neighbors, exclusively through this ABM. We next go on to
describe several models that define these two probability measures in Equation 5.
6.3.2 Individual Decisions
Most of the diffusion models that measure the impact of behavior are somewhat
mechanical and not strategic, meaning that the probability that an agent adopts a
specific behavior is proportional to the infection rate of her/his peers. However, the
controlled experiments show that social influence based exclusively on the quantity of
peer signals at any time does not always determine the outcome and that individual
choices of rational agents can determine the diffusion process quite significantly.
Additionally, each agent wants to maximize her/his utility through intentionally
selecting behaviors. Intuitively, considering the stochastic and non-stationary nature of
human decision, it is essential to accommodate uncertainty when users infer utility from
interactions. We achieve this individual decision component through the following latent
variable. Let the utilities associated with the choice of making the optimal decision be
given by a latent unobserved variable xu(t) that determines the individual utility that
drives user u’s decision making at time t. Since in most real world studies, there is no
straightforward way to determine the individual intentions behind resharing a message,
we use this variable to capture it. In the context of sub-optimal decision making, this
utility from an agent’s standpoint towards optimal choices now counts as a loss towards
the net utility for making sub-optimal decisions.
We do note that as mentioned in several existing studies [44], there can be several
other factors like the infectiousness of the current event, user’s other intrinsic factors
that contribute to the utility - we repeat that all these factors can be incorporated to
make the model more realistic. The utility that a user gets from making the optimal
decision is then
µ(t) = xu(t) +  (6)
Here  is an iid random variable drawn from some generating distribution that accounts
for the uncertainty in the behavior of individuals beyond their own utility for a decision.
As will be mentioned later, we start the simulation after already observing the initial set
of reshares for a cascade. Following this in this work, we consider that the utility a user
gains from selecting the optimal choice as per its own knowledge is constant over time
after the initial stage.
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6.3.3 Utility from Influence Decision
Social influence phenomenon arising out of individual interactions is measured through
pairwise influences that result in a complex contagion. The basic assumption is that the
probability of an agent being activated is dependent on the heterogeneous pairwise
probabilities between the agent and its peers. In the simplest case for a specific
individual, when we just measure the number of peers who have already adopted a
particular message as a measure of social influence [45], the probability p′u(t) that u is
activated at time t is given by:
p′u(t) =
1
1 + exp(−[ηu Au(t) + βu]) (7)
where ηu, βu are coefficients to be estimated. Equivalently,
ζu(t) = ln
( p′u(t)
1− p′u(t)
)
= ηu Au(t) + βu (8)
where coefficient ηu measures the social influence or social correlation effect for u.
Intuitively, the right hand side of Equation 8 denotes the utility of the agent u obtained
from adopting the influence decision in situations where resharing is not the optimal
choice.
One of the key observations from the controlled experiments shown in Fig 8(a) and
(b) is that the slow compounding effect on behavior outcome from linear influence
cascades may not be the best in terms of the desired outcome at all time steps. We
observe that the sudden spike in signals at time step 4 for the delayed cascade
participants (when both LC and DC participants had 4 peer exposures) allows for more
users in DC to respond to social influence compared to the LC group. We introduce a
scaling factor for the quantity of peer signals that capture this spiking effect. To this
end, instead of using the number of exposures directly as the peer effect, as an
alternative we substitute Au(t) with the following
Au(t) = Au(t).e
σ(Au(t)−Au(t−1)−1) (9)
The intuition behind the augmented exposures is that the sudden spike makes an
amplifying effect on the social influence measure and so should be accounted for. Here σ
is the parameter that controls the amplifying exponential curve. Note that for the linear
cascade pattern, where there is a single increase in the peer exposure at t with respect
to t− 1 at all times, the amplification is null. The scaling parameter σ is held constant
for all agents.
6.3.4 Models of decision making
Using the above two components, we arrive at two models of activation based on
Equation 5 and we use these 2 models to run our simulation procedure:
1. Base model (BM): We use Equations 6 and 7 to arrive at the following
probability of activation
pu(t) =
1
1 + exp
(
−
[
(ηu Au(t) + βu)− (xu(t) + )
]) (10)
2. Augmented Exposure model (AEM): We use Equations 6 and 9 to arrive at
the following probability of activation with the augmented peer exposures
pu(t) =
1
1 + exp
(
−
[
(ηu (Au(t).eσ(Au(t)−Au(t−1)−1)) + βu)− (xu(t) + )
]) (11)
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The above two probabilities represent the situation when the agent decides to
reshare the message after weighing the utilities from the two components. Since we
adopt a binary choice model, we do not explicitly model the utilities of the other choice
which is to not reshare the message. The probability of an agent not sharing the
message is then just 1− pu(t).
6.4 Learning model parameters
With the models of activation stated as above, we now describe how we set the
parameters of the model in the simulation procedure. We specifically work with
information cascades representative of real world diffusion [46] as will be described later
while discussing the dataset. Since we consider rumor diffusion as the real world study
and we calibrate the parameters of the models to this dataset by splitting it into
training and evaluation sets as is prevalent in machine learning setups. Specifically, we
start the behavior diffusion simulation of the agents after observing part of the diffusion
cascades till Tthresh. That is, we first observe the cascades from their beginning to a
specific time span Tthresh for learning and leave the rest of each cascade after Tthresh to
be used for evaluation of the ABM. This helps us in 2 ways: first, it allows us to
perform simulation with the assumption that the agents had the time to form some
opinion of their own using the exploration strategy as setup in the controlled
experiments. Second, it allows us to learn the parameters specific to each agent in a
data-driven way prior to start of simulation and allows us to perform evaluation of the
ABM based diffusion process after Tthresh.
In our work, we treat the latent utility factor xu(t) as a parameter of interest and we
consider that the agent’s individual decision utility is fixed. So for our work, we
consider xu(t) = xu for all time steps t ∈ [1, T ]. Specifically, the parameters of interest
specific to agents are θu = {xu, ηu, βu} and the parameter σ which we set to a constant
during our evaluation. Since it is not easy to map the controlled experimental
environment to situations in observational studies, we do not consider agent histories
and so instead of learning individual agent parameters {xu, ηu, βu}, for each u, we
instead divide all the agents into L latent groups. This also captures the notion that
agents in a connected network belong to a latent block structure or specifically
stochastic block models [47]. In a stochastic block model, each agent is assigned to a
block and the pattern of influence between different agents depends only on their block
assignment. Following this, the overall probability that u belongs to class l ∈ [1, L] is
given by pl = P [lu = l] with
∑L
l=1 pl = 1. So all the individual agent specific
parameters {xu, ηu, βu} are now replaced by {xl, ηl, βl}. Let θl= {xl, ηl, βl} be the
parameters specific to the latent class l. Denoting zu(t)=1 if the agent reshares the
message (sub-optimal decision) and 0 otherwise, Zu = {zu(t)}, ∀t ∈ [1, T ], the likelihood
contribution of u belonging to latent class l is then given by:
f(Zu; θl) =
∏
t
pu(t)
zu(t)(1− pu(t))(1−zu(t)) (12)
Denoting the set of parameters Θ = [θ1, . . . , θL], P = [p1, . . . , pL] and Au = {Au(t)},
∀t ∈ [1, T ], the likelihood of the model is then given by:
L(Θ,P|D,A) =
∏
u
(
∑
l
pl f(Zu; θl)) (13)
So our log-likelihood is:
l(Θ,P) =
∑
u
log
(∑
l
pl f(zu(t); θl)
)
(14)
May 27, 2020 24/40
We attempt to compute the posterior distribution of the parameters given the
observations:
P (Θl, pl|Au, Zu) = plf(zu(t); θl)∑
l pl f(zu(t); θl)
(15)
Denoting Wu = {Au, Zu} for all agents u, we first attempt to compute the posterior
distribution of pl,u=P (lu = l|Wu), given the observations. And formally it is given by:
P (lu = l|Wu) = ku,l = P (Wu|lu = l)P (lu = l)
P (Wu)
=
pil f(Zu; θl)∑
l pil f(Zu; θl)
(16)
The lower bound log-likelihood following Equation 14 takes the form
ll =
∑
u
logEl∼ku,l
[pilf(Zu; θl
ku,l
]
≥
∑
u
∑
l
ku,l log
pilf(Zu; θl)
klu
(17)
Taking the derivative of ll with respect to xu and keeping other parameters fixed, we
get
∇xl ll = ∇xl
∑
u
∑
l
ku,l log
pilf(Zu; θl)
klu
= ∇xl
∑
u
∑
l
ku,l log
pil
[∏
t pu(t)
zu(t)(1− pu(t))(1−zu(t))
]
klu
= ∇xl
∑
u
∑
l
[
ku,l log
pil
ku,l
+ ku,l log
[∏
t
pu(t)
zu(t)(1− pu(t))(1−zu(t))
]]
= ∇xl
∑
u
∑
l
[
ku,l log
pil
ku,l
+ ku,l
∑
t
[
zu(t) log pu(t) + (1− zu(t)) log(1− pu(t))
]]
=
∑
u
∑
l
[
ku,l
∑
t
[
zu(t)∇xl log pu(t) + (1− zu(t))∇xl log(1− pu(t))
]]
=
∑
u
∑
l
[
ku,l
∑
t
[zu(t)
pu(t)
∇xlpu(t)−
(1− zu(t)
1− pu(t)
)
∇xlpu(t)
]]
=
∑
u
∑
l
[
ku,l
∑
t
[zu(t)
pu(t)
−
(1− zu(t)
1− pu(t)
)]
∇xlpu(t)
]
(18)
The derivative of pu(t) considering the base model BM with respect to xu keeping other
parameters fixed is
∇xlpu(t) = ∇xl
1
1 + exp
(
−
[
(ηu Al(t) + βl)− (xl(t) + )
])
=
exp
(
−
[
(ηl Al(t) + βl)− (xl(t) + )
])
(
1 + exp
(
−
[
(ηl Al(t) + βl)− (xl(t) + )
]))2∇xl(−xl(t)− )
= −
exp
(
−
[
(ηl Al(t) + βl)− (xl(t) + )
])
(
1 + exp
(
−
[
(ηl Al(t) + βl)− (xl(t) + )
]))2
(19)
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Charlie Hebdo Putin Missing Ferguson Unrest
Network Nodes 17426 243 4534
Network Edges 33598 520 12076
# cascades 74 11 53
Avg. in-degree 1.98 2.12 3.04
Table 4: Statistics of the data used for simulation relating the 3 events.
Similarly, the gradients with respect to other parameters ηl, βl and pl can also be
calculated and the parameter updates in the M step can be performed via gradient
descent using the following procedure. This is a standard finite mixture model where
the parameters are estimated by the Expectation Maximization (EM) framework [48].
The brief steps to obtain the parameter estimates are as follows:
6.5 Dataset
We use the Twitter dataset released publicly by authors in [49] which analyzed how
people orient to and spread rumors in social media. As discussed in that study,
adapting the existing definition to the context of breaking news stories, a rumor is
defined as ”circulating story of questionable veracity, which is apparently credible but
hard to verify, and produces sufficient skepticism and/or anxiety so as to motivate
finding out the actual truth”. The tweets from that study were collected from the
streaming API relating to newsworthy events that could potentially prompt the
initiation and propagation of rumours. Selected rumours were then captured in the form
of conversation threads. The authors used Twitter’s streaming API to collect tweets in
two different situations: (1) breaking news that are likely to spark multiple rumours and
(2) specific rumours that are identified a-priori. They collected a total of 9 events
pertaining to these situations but we use the threads from 3 events in this paper. The
twitter threads were related to the following 3 events:
• Charlie Hebdo Shooting: Two brothers forced their way into the offices of the
French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France killing 11 people
and wounding 11 more, on January 2015.
• Ferguson unrest: The citizens of Ferguson in Michigan, USA, protested after
the fatal shooting of an 18-year-old African American, Michael Brown, by a white
police officer on August 9, 2014.
• Putin missing: Numerous rumors emerged in March 2015 when the Russian
president Vladimir Putin did not appear in public for 10 days. He spoke on the
11th day, denying all rumors that he had been ill or was dead.
Since the publicly released dataset only contained a sample of the threads as
compared to the those used in [49], we picked these 3 events which had relatively larger
proportion of rumor threads among all the events. The authors in the study curated the
annotations for the threads as to whether they were rumors or not with the help of
several journalists. We consider all the threads for the events which were tagged as
rumors such that the stories related to these threads were later verified as false. Fact
checking for these threads were performed by a group of annotators post these events
and while the entire event might have been later described as true, there were threads
related to those events that spread misinformation. The statistics of the data pertaining
to these 3 events is provided in Table 4. For each of the events, the dataset provides us
with the following segregated information modules:
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Algorithm 1: Simulating the diffusion of cascade q based on social influence and
individual decisions.
Input: Tthresh, Activated Set A (till time Tthresh), Time limit Tsim, Θ,P, σ,
users Vq, G, Model Type MT
Output: Diffusion Node Set DFq[t], ∀t ∈ [1, Tsim]
activated ← A
DFq[0] ← {}
for t=1 to Tsim do
curr activated ← {}
DFq[t] ← DFq[t− 1]
for each agent u ∈ Vq \ activated do
lv ← arg max
l
plf(zu(Tthresh);θl)∑
l pl f(zu(Tthresh);θl)
/* Calculate individual factor µu(t) */
 ∼ N (0, 1)
compute µu(t) with Equation 6 using  and xlv
/* Calculate utility from influence ζu(t) */
if MT == BM then
compute ζu(t) with Equation 8
else
compute Au(t) using G with Equation 9
compute ζu(t) with Equation 8
/* Calculate probability of activation pu(t) */
pu(t) ← 11+exp(−[ζu(t)−µu(t)]
if pu(t) > 0.5 then
DFq[t] ← DFq[t] ∪ {v}
curr activated ← curr activated ∪ {v}
activated ← activated ∪ curr activated
return DFq
1. Initialize the parameters Θ,P and evaluate the log likelihood of the model using
Equation 14.
2. E-Step: Evaluate the posterior probabilities using the current values of Θ,P,
with Equation 16.
3. M-Step: Update the parameters Θ,P with the current values of the posterior
using the gradients obtained through maximization of the log likelihood with
respect to parameters.
4. Evaluate the log-likelihood with the new parameter estimates. If the log-likelihood
has changed by less than some small , stop, else reiterate Steps 2 and 3.
1. Who-follows-who network : This social network is sampled to cater to specific
users who participated through either replying to tweets or retweeting that
specific event - this allows us to focus our simulation for each event using this
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Fig 11: Degree distribution of the followee networks.
network N instead of using one large social network common to all events. It
helps in part by enabling us in the evaluation part where we compare our set of
activated individuals at each time step to the actual users who were activated.
2. Retweet cascades: In our work, we consider retweet cascades and do not include
users who simply replied to a particular tweet since it is challenging to deduce
whether a user agreed to the agenda of the cascade while replying - the notion
that induces a cascade of like minded individuals. So we restrict users in the
cascade to those who only retweeted the source tweets.
So, we operationalize our simulation of behavior diffusion described in details in the
next section, for each event separately. We use the follower networks for each event to
simulate the diffusion and use the retweet cascades to learn the agent parameters
specific to each event.
6.6 Simulation Algorithm
We now describe the algorithm for operationalizing the simulation of behavior diffusion
based on the influence setup described in Section 6.3. As mentioned before, agents refer
to users in the social network and a one-one mapping to the actual network of the
events from the dataset. In our work, we use the follower networks relevant to each
event, which are directed in its edges and we refer to such networks as G. The
algorithm for the agent based model for social influence based diffusion process is
described in Algorithm 1.
The diffusion simulation unfolds in discrete time steps and at each step, multiple
agents can change their states (initial state being the state where the user/node has not
reshared the message) - however, once they transition from non-shared to shared state,
they cannot switch back. We observe the users who participated in the first Tthresh
steps of the cascades and use that to learn the parameters, specifically the latent class l
specific parameters θl, pl for all classes l ∈ [1, L]. We then use the activated nodes (who
have already reshared the rumor prior to Tthresh) along with these learnt parameters as
input to the simulation algorithm. From thereon, we run the algorithm for a span of
Tsim discrete time steps. For each t ∈ [1, Tsim], the algorithm outputs the number of
agents who reshared the rumor message at time t or were activated at time t. In each
step t, we loop through all the agents in the network that are yet to reshare the
message. Since we projected each agent into a mixture of latent classes L, prior to the
simulation step, we need to categorize each agent into one of the latent classes in order
to compute pu(t) with the respective parameters of the latent class they belong to. We
observe Du(t), Au(t) of each user u till Tthresh in the real world data and then the
May 27, 2020 28/40
latent class can be decided by the maximum of posterior arg max
l
ku,l (Equation 16)
from the data. Then the probability of activation is computed based on Equations 10
and 11 depending on whether the base model or the augmented exposures model is used
(the algorithm mentions the general form of the equation based on Equation 5). If this
calculated probability is higher than 0.5, the agent is activated and the simulation
continues for other agents for that time step.
6.7 Evaluation of ABM
One of the specific goals we had while setting up the ABM was to compare the 2 models
we proposed - the base model which relies on the magnitude of peer signals as the factor
for social influence and the augmented model which allows for accommodating the
sequential changes in peer signals. To this end, we compare the diffusion trajectory of
the cascades from simulations based on each model and the real world data. We note
that all the parameters of the models represented in Equations 10 and 11 are learnt
from the data, except for the noise random variable η that adds uncertainty to the
individual utilities. We sample  ∼ N (0, 1) and following this, we execute 100 runs of
the simulation algorithm for each cascade (thread) for each event in the data to account
for this uncertainty. For learning the parameters as mentioned before, we observe the
cascades for each event till time Tthresh. Since the time span of resharing actions for
each cascade is different and in the absence of any normalization procedure that could
be applied to decide on a single Tthresh for all cascades, we instead observe the first 40%
of each cascade (in terms of total number of reshares in the cascade) in the
chronological order of reshares. This allows us to keep the Tthresh dynamic for each
cascade while allowing the rest of the cascade to be used for ABM evaluation.
To evaluate the simulation results, for each cascade q, we consider the set of users
Vq ∈ V (G) for each network G relevant to the event, such that all users in Vq reshared q
in the time span of the cascade. We run each simulation round for Tsim=20 steps. For
each time step t in our simulation, we compute the following metric for each cascade:
|Vq∩DFq [t]|
|Vq| , the number of actual activated users which are also part of the activated
users from the simulation algorithm at time t. We call this measure the True Diffusion
Rate of our simulation algorithm. The metric does not measure prediction results here
since there is no way in which we can precisely map a time step in our simulation to a
numeric time interval in the real world dataset. The metric allows us to measure recall
over the users who reshared the rumors while allowing us to simulate the trajectory of
the diffusion over time. Figs 12 show the results of the ABM simulation for the 2
simulations. For each event, we run the 2 models as described in Section 6.3. So we
have a total of 6 models and we learn 6 sets of parameters and run 100 simulations for
each model that learns the parameters of the ABM.
Figs 12(a), (b) and (c) show the plots corresponding to the true diffusion rate over
time and it compares the two models: the BM model where the peer influence at time t
is characterized by the number of neighbors of a user who have reshared the rumor
message till t and the AEM model where the peer influence at time t is characterized
by the augmented exposures till t given in Equation 9. For all the results, we plot the
mean of the True Diffusion Rate at each time step taking all cascades for the respective
events into account. We discuss the results from the two events Charlie Hebdo and
Putin missing and then Ferguson arrest events below:
Charlie Hebdo and Putin missing: For the cascades related to both these events,
the AEM model which takes into account our notion of augmented exposures, exhibits
faster diffusion rate compared to the BM model. The results are not surprising in this
scenario since the additive factor of influence coming from the spike in neighbor
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(a) Charlie Hebdo (b) Putin missing
(c) Ferguson unrest
Fig 12: ABM results for the simulation using Algorithm 1 on 3 Twitter who-follows-whom
network for the events (a) Charlie Hebdo, (b) Putin missing and (c) Ferguson unrest
information in the AEM model augments the utility from social influence resulting in
faster diffusion. Not only this, but we also observe from that for the cascades in Putin
Missing events, the diffusion rate for the AEM model is an order of magnitude higher in
the initial stages till 7 time steps and the AEM model reaches the saturation point of
the curve faster than the BM model.
On closer analysis, we find that the network structure in this case has an important
role to play. The degree distribution for the network used for Putin missing event
displayed in Fig 11 shows that there are only a few nodes with high in-degree or the
number of potential peer signals. So the spikes in the adoption curve for the Putin
missing event happens when these few nodes with high in-degree (or higher potential of
exposure to peer siganls) are now exposed to the message from multiple peers and they
reshare the message - this happens earlier for the AEM model than the BM model.
Consequently, this result shows that faster diffusion in real world networks can often be
attributed to the presence of a few nodes who are more susceptible to exposure,
resulting in faster adoption at a population level. It shows how peer signals in the initial
stages can drive diffusion faster for the rest of the trajectory.
We also observe that in both these events, the dynamics of adoption do not vary
much in that at no point does the adoption rate induced by the BM model surpass the
AEM model - this also suggests that when population-level adoption is faster shown by
the fact that in both cases, almost 70% of the actual users who reshared the message
were activated in our AEM model by time step 7, user uncertainty does not account for
much and the peer signals drive the dynamics.
Ferguson arrest: For the cascades belonging to Ferguson arrest event, we find that in
contrast to the results discussed above, the AEM model results in slower diffusion than
the base model after time step 4 as shown in Fig 12(c). On closer analysis, the reasons
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behind this can be attributed to two key observations: (1) slow initial diffusion prior to
start of simulation for cascades belonging to Ferguson arrest event : it took an average
of Tthresh=25 and 31 hours for the cascades to reach 40% of their final affected
population for the Charlie Hebdo and the Putin missing events respectively, while it
took roughly Tthresh=134 hours to reach the same 40% of the final size for the cascades
in the Ferguson unrest events. This also led to the models setting high values of µu(t)
from the learning procedure prior to start of simulation i.e. the user uncertainties were
learned to be higher at the start of the simulation resulting in slower diffusion through
the simulation given that it took 10 time steps to reach 70% of the population in
contrast to 7 time steps for the other two events. (2) the slower diffusion led to many
nodes not experiencing any increase in peer signals, resulting in lower probability of
activation over time, since note that the factor eAu(t)−Au(t−1)−1 could be less than 1
when Au(t) = Au(t− 1) i.e. there are no increase in peer exposures which happens to
be the case in this situation.
Consequently, the social influence factor drops in AEM model after time step 4
compared to the BM model which explains the plot Fig 12(c). This suggests that in
networked situations unlike our experimental environment, slower initial diffusion can
result in initial higher uncertainty which can eventually result in the decay of the
influence factor later on. In such cases delayed stimulus through interventions would be
the only way for peer influence to play a bigger role which of course would be
undesirable in such sub-optimal choice diffusion scenarios. As mentioned before, one of
the limitations of this model lies in the setup that a user cannot transition back to a
state it has explored - this limits us in measuring the retention effect concurrent to what
we tested for the Early Cascade phenomenon. However we believe that our binary
choice model can be extended to multiple choice data given relevant case studies - this
would then allow for understanding the retention effect in real world and whether early
exposures are not an effective tool for retention over the long run that we concluded
from our controlled experiment setup.
7 General Discussion
The primary goal of our studies was to examine how individuals’ decisions are influenced
by the decisions of others, particularly when they are exposed to different cascading peer
influence patterns. Through a behavioral experiment and a data-driven agent-based
model, we explore how social influence can play a role in sub-optimal behavior diffusion.
Specifically, we investigated how temporal patterns of influence, by and large, affect
decision-makers when the decisions have utilities. We conducted two sets of studies: in
study 1, we developed a controlled experimental setup that divided participants into 5
groups based on the manner in which they were treated to peer signals or the PoI over
time. Our first hypothesis, that studied this effect of PoI on behavior outcome,
confirmed that an early exposure to signals commands the most success in terms of
desired outcome when aggregated over all time steps of the game. However, it did not
shed much light on the temporal variations between-groups in decision making. Based
on a second hypothesis that attempted to study this aspect, we analyzed the influence
of the quantity of peer signals across the time steps. We find that the effect of the same
quantity of signals can have a substantially different effect based on the PoI - while early
exposure to a large peer influence can decay very fast thus failing the retention effect
one would hope would come from early exposures, a delayed stimulus in peer signals
proves to be a successful strategy in resurgence of the desired outcome of influence.
The first study was conducted to focus on the nature of peer influence on
sub-optimal choice diffusion. However, in real world applications, information diffuses
through networked environments. Additionally, the controlled settings implicitly do not
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allow us to measure the role of individual uncertainty or private information which is an
additional cognitive factor that remains difficult to be measured. To complement the
online controlled study, we conducted a simulation on real world Twitter networks to
measure the impact of influence decisions towards rumor diffusion. We find that over a
long a period of time, the influence effect from majority of an individual’s peers are
sufficiently large to persuade users to follow their neighbors despite having to reshare a
message of questionable veracity. While that is intuitive, we find that surprisingly when
information diffusion is slow at the beginning of a cascade, individual uncertainty can
play a substantial role as time progresses and can itself impact this influence effect thus
impacting the trajectory of adoption. Our conclusions deviate from the existing notions
of networks being the main constituents controlling both the probability of successful
social influence and the resharing models. Our conclusions point to adversarial
situations where the network organization can be manipulated to now be used for
devising successful social influence mechanisms. These strategies or patterns of influence
can become the confounding factors behind the outcomes and therefore these deserve to
be studied in more detail.
Such conclusions can have diverse implications in the real world, where strategies to
encourage harmful decisions could be weaponized in adversarial situations. Social
influence is key to technology adoption, and research on the role of persuasion in
security technology adoption indicates that various social influence factors impact a
user’s decision when making decisions to purchase or use a given technology . However,
these studies have primarily investigated the role of benign social influence and not how
it can be harnessed to harm users, e.g. by cyber-adversaries. Specifically, social
influence has primarily been studied in the context of it having a net positive impact on
society, especially when considering the utility of the decisions made through influence.
Given the slew of recent events in which cyber warriors exploit social media with
malicious intent, researchers and policy-makers are reconsidering the role of social
influence as a tool for change. Together, these simulations and the behavioral
experiment illustrate the power of multidisciplinary, complimentary work in the
computational social sciences. Use of modeling and the principles of experimentation
allow us to more holistically study the effect of social influence on decision-making.
The current research thus sheds on the principled manner in which influence
patterns can be harnessed to achieve a desired outcome that could be harmful in myriad
ways. While it is evident from our growth models, that the role of the magnitude of
signals on the decision outcome is significant across time, we also find that the absolute
quantity of peer signals can command different probabilities of success when
disseminated using different mechanisms. Following this, we see our research being
extended to multiple directions: a straightforward extension would be to test these
patterns at scale when the number of peers that a user is subject to is large and so the
duration of the game is also proportionally extended. A second direction can be
extended to situations where the users also stand to lose money for certain decisions - in
the real world these could be factors like costing users their credibility and reputation
for the wrong choice and it remains to be seen whether users would still be tempted to
explore or would they exploit the best option more often. Similarly, the agent based
model can be extended to multi-armed bandit situations where specific algorithms could
be devised based on regret achieved from a convex combination of utilities derived from
social influence and its own experience.
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Supporting Information
8 Demographics of participants in online
experiments
Gender Age in years (bins)
18-25 26-35 35-45 46-55 56-65 years 65 Total
Female 11 67 38 22 8 5 151
Male 18 99 34 24 14 1 190
No Answer 0 7 4 3 0 0 14
Total 29 173 76 49 22 6
Table 5: Table showing the age distributions of users
Gender Education
Some High
School
(9-11 grades)
High School
Graduate
Some College
(no degree)
Associate’s
Degree
Female 0 14 25 21
Male 0 13 32 24
No Answer 1 1 3 0
Total 1 28 60 45
Bachelor’s Degree Some Graduate (no degree)
Female 64 2 20 5
Male 83 6 27 4
No Answer 6 1 2 0
Total 153 9 49 9
Table 6: Table showing the education level of the participants.
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Gender Income
Less than
$25,000
$25,000
-$49,999 $50,000-$74,999 $75,000-$99,999
Female 19 51 41 17
Male 15 59 52 32
No Answer 1 5 4 2
Total 35 115 97 51
$100,000
-$124,999
$125,000
-$149,999 $150,000+ (no degree)
Female 14 4 5 5
Male 9 8 12 4
No Answer 1 0 1 0
Total 24 12 18 9
Table 7: Table showing the income level distributions of users
9 Survey Analysis
There was no main effect of the signal pattern on the number of attacks prevented ( 2)
or on the final amount of money participants earned [ANOVA: F(4, 341) = 1.099, p =
0.357, η2 = 0.013]. Unexpectedly, not a single survey measure correlated significantly
with the number of attacks prevented after correcting for multiple comparisons, but
there were some interesting correlations between survey measures that I think are worth
exploring more.
For instance:
• It’s interesting and somewhat expected that people who have a more competitive
approach to interpersonal conflict might be less likely to want to be similar to
others.
• IC Competing ∼ Social Influence similarity, r = -0.23, p < 0.000.
• Neuroticism was negatively correlated with being a rational decision-maker:
neurotScore ∼ Rational r = -0.24, p < 0.000.
• All measures of the computer subscale were negatively correlated with desire to be
similar to others (Social Influence similarity): Computer.Anxiety ∼
Social Influence similarity r= -0.35; Computer.Confidence ∼
Social Influence similarity r=-0.4 , Computer.Liking ∼ Social Influence similarity
r=-0.43; Computer.Usefulness.CASU ∼ Social Influence similarity r=-0.5, p’s <
0.000
• People who were higher in self-control also prefer risk when it comes to finance.
STP Self.control ∼ Risk Pref Finance, r=0.56, p < 0.000
• Yet people who are intuitive decision-makers tend to prefer risk when it comes to
finance intuition ∼ Risk Pref Finance r = 0.28, p < 0.000.
Some expected correlation:
• People who have a more dependent approach to interpersonal conflict are more
susceptible to normative social influence.
• Dependent ∼ Social Influence Norm r = 0.361747405 p < 0.000.
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• People who considered themselves more rational consider themselves more
risk-averse when it comes to finance, Rational ∼ Risk Pref Finance r = -0.23, p <
0.000.
• People who have a more open personality type also favor a collaborative style
when approaching interpersonal conflicts. openScore ∼ IC Collaborating, r = 0.41,
p < 0.000.
10 Distributions of decisions by individuals: time
steps 1 to 12 (No Social Signals)
(a)
(b)
Fig 13: Probability of decisions made in time steps 1 to 12. (a) Probability of making
the optimal decision. (b) Probability of making the sub-optimal (other 5) decision. The
error bars denote standard error over the distributions.
11 Tables showing the results of 2 sample t-test
comparing the distribution of decisions made by
individuals over the time steps
The tables below - one for LC, EC and DC each, shows the comparison between each
treatment group among LC, EC and DC and the control groups UM, NM considering
the number of times each decision di is selecte by participants. The figures in the table
show the p-values of the t-test that compares the difference in the means of the
May 27, 2020 38/40
distributions over the time steps. We display the results for time steps 1-12 and time
steps 13-18 separately. The figures in brackets show the difference in the mean of the
distributions between the treatment group and the control group (control group among
UM, NM corresponding to the row in consideration).
p-values
Decisions
1 2 3 4 5 6
Time Steps
1 -12
No
Mes-
sage
0.85 (-
0.008)
0.72 (-
0.004)
.71
(0.007)
.78
(0.004)
.19
(0.024)
.66 (-
0.009)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
0.27 (-
0.03)
0.39 (-
0.011)
.74
(0.004)
.80 (-
0.003)
.42
(0.015)
.06
(0.03)
13 - 18
No
Mes-
sage
0.42(-
0.05)
0.9(-
0.002)
0.72 (-
0.01)
0.28
(0.03)
0.24
(0.02)
0.7
(0.01)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
0.04 (-
0.13)
0.32
(0.01)
0.16
(0.03)
0.003
(0.03)
0.75 (-
0.008)
0.41
(0.02)
Table 8: Linear Cascade group - The tables shows the p-values of the hypothesis
test that measures the difference in the means of the decision distributions (of choos-
ing/adopting the influence decision) of the users in linear cascade group and the control
groups. Bold values denote significant differences considering α=0.05.
p-values
Decisions
1 2 3 4 5 6
time steps
1 -12
No
Mes-
sage
0.85
(0.006)
.27(-
0.016)
.88 (-
0.003)
.50
(0.014)
.26
(0.018)
.38(-
0.017)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
.43(-
0.02)
.12(-
0.02)
.55
(0.009)
.86
(0.002)
.57
(0.009)
.089
(0.02)
13 - 18
No
Mes-
sage
0.93(-
0.0055)
0.66
(0.01)
.35 (-
0.02)
0.65
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
.46
(0.02)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
0.21 (-
0.08)
.09
(0.01)
.42
(0.01)
0.04
(0.04)
.91 (-
0.003)
.68 (-
0.01)
Table 9: Delayed Cascade - The tables shows the p-values of the hypothesis test that
measures the difference in the means of the decision distributions (of choosing/adopting
the influence decision) of the users in delayed cascade group and the control groups.
Bold values denote significant differences considering α=0.05.
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p-values
Decisions
1 2 3 4 5 6
time steps
1 -12
No
Mes-
sage
0.73 (-
0.014)
.37
(0.01)
.81 (-
0.005)
.11
(0.02)
.81 (-
0.005)
.24 (-
0.02)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
.18 (-
0.04)
.68
(0.006)
.61
(0.007)
.22
(0.016)
.75 (-
0.005)
.14
(0.02)
13 - 18
No
Mes-
sage
0.29 (-
0.07)
0.25
(0.03)
.46
(-0.02)
(-0.02)
0.92 (-
0.002)
0.007
(0.07)
.99
(0.0001)
Uniform
Mes-
sage
0.02 (-
0.07)
.03
(0.25)
.31
(0.02)
0.12
(0.03)
.24
(0.03)
.69
(0.01)
Table 10: Early Cascade - The tables shows the p-values of the hypothesis test that
measures the difference in the means of the decision distributions (of choosing/adopting
the influence decision) of the users in early cascade group and the control groups. Bold
values denote significant differences considering α=0.05.
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